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Abstract
This paper studies the employment and wage effects of VAT rebates to exporters with
comprehensive firm-product-level data of China. It is found that the adjustments in
VAT rebates significantly and positively affect firm’s employment but have no statisti-
cally significant effect on firm’s wage. Moreover, this paper finds that the employment
effect of VAT rebates is heterogeneous across firms. In particular, low-productivity
firms are more sensitive to the adjustments of VAT rebates than high-productivity firms,
suggesting that an increase of VAT rebates may cause mis-reallocation of resources.
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In open economies, trade policy has been considered as an important influencing factor
of the labor market.1 The input value-added tax (VAT) rebates to exporters have been a
commonly-used and frequently-adjusted trade policy in China. On average, VAT rebates
have accounted for 1.8% of GDP and 10.8% of government total tax revenue for the last 15
years.2 The rates of VAT rebates have been adjusted more than 30 times since the country’s
tax system reform in 1994. However, the impact of VAT rebates on the labor market is so
far unclear. Does the benefit from the rebates pass through to the labor market? Do firms
increase employment and/or wage when receiving higher rebates? This paper empirically
addresses these questions by studying the employment and wage effects of VAT rebates with
comprehensive linked firm-product-level data.
Understanding the employment and wage effects of VAT rebates is important for two
reasons. First, the trade literature of heterogeneous firms suggests that resource reallocation
across firms is a natural consequence of trade liberalization, and it accounts for a signifi-
cant part of the overall welfare effect of the trade policy.3 The adjustments of VAT rebates
provide a unique setting for evaluating the impact of this specific trade policy on labor (mis-
)reallocation across firms. Our study adds labor market evidence to the above-mentioned
general literature. Second, the analysis of VAT rebates can shed light on the potential effects
of export tax on the labor market, on which the evidence is rather limited. As shown by
Feldstein and Krugman (1990), when VAT is only partially rebated, the non-refunded part
effectively acts as an export tax.4 An increase in the rate of VAT rebates is then equivalent
to a decrease of export tax. Utilizing the adjustments in the rates of VAT rebates in China,
our study thus provides new evidence on the labor market effects of an export tax.
In practice, the rates of VAT rebates are set at the product level. However, the data of
employment and wage is usually collected at the firm level. Therefore, we construct a firm-
specific rate of VAT rebates and estimate the employment and wage effects of VAT rebates
at the firm level. We define the firm-specific rate of VAT rebates as the average of the rates
of VAT rebates of all products exported by a firm, weighted by the share of each product
in the firm’s total exports. Moreover, we follow Yu (2015) to use the export share of each
1For example, see Trefler (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), Amiti and Davis (2012) and Krishna et al.
(2014) on the effects of tariff reduction on the labor market. See Campa and Goldberg (2001), Verhoogen
(2008), Nucci and Pozzolo (2010) and Dai and Xu (2017) on the effects of exchange rate shocks on the labor
market.
2Calculated from China Statistical Year Book compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China.
3For example, see Pavcnik (2002), Melitz (2003) and Trefler (2004).




































































product calculated from firms’ data in the initial year during the sample period. This is to
mitigate the bias in the estimation of the employment and wage effects of VAT rebates, as
the contemporaneous export weights may be correlated with a firm’s employment and wage.
Another estimation bias may arise when the changes in the product-level rate of VAT rebates
are endogenous to firm’s employment and wage. For example, many changes in the rates
of VAT rebates are responses to export shocks, such as the changes after Asian financial
crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2008. An endogeneity issue arises if export
shocks affect firm’s employment and wage through other channels (than affecting the rate
of VAT rebates) that are not controlled for. However, we argue that the changes in the rates
of VAT rebates in our analysis are plausibly exogenous to firm’s employment and wage. We
select the data from January 2003 to December 2006 for our analysis. During this period, as
stated in the official circulars, the changes in the rates of VAT rebates were aimed at tackling
domestic economic issues such as upgrading the economy structure, optimizing natural re-
source consumption and reducing environmental pollution. Braakmann et al. (2020) provide
evidence that the changes in the rates of VAT rebates during this period were related to prod-
uct characteristics, such as whether the product is resource-intensive, high-tech, pollutive or
energy-consuming, and were unrelated to various measures of export shocks. Therefore,
the changes in the rates of VAT rebates in our analysis are plausibly exogenous to firm’s
employment and wage.
Our preferred empirical specification finds that the adjustments in VAT rebates signif-
icantly affect firm’s employment while having no statistically significant impact on firm’s
average wage. More specifically, a one percentage point increase in firm-specific rate of VAT
rebates raises firm’s employment by 0.236%. Compared with the employment growth of the
firms whose VAT rebates are changed in our sample, the changes in VAT rebates reduce
employment growth rate by around 3.6%. This indicates that the changes in VAT rebates are
an important factor affecting firm’s employment. There are two possible explanations of the
employment effect: exports and financial constraints. On one hand higher VAT rebates give
rise to the increase of export quantity and price, requiring firms to employ more labor (e.g.
Chandra and Long, 2013; Gourdon et al., 2019; and Braakmann et al., 2020). On the other
hand, the increases in VAT rebates essentially represent cash flows back to firms, potentially
relaxing firms’ financial constraints and enabling them to adjustment their employment.
Our estimated employment and wage effects of VAT rebates are qualitatively insensitive
to various robustness checks. Firstly, we use alternative export share, including mean share
from initial year to last year and export share lagged by one year and two years, to calculate
firm-specific rate of VAT rebates. Secondly, we calculate firm-specific rate of VAT rebates



































































of firm-specific rate of VAT rebates are very robust. Thirdly, we estimate employment and
wage effects using small exporters as a safeguard to the exogenous adjustments of the rates
of VAT rebate in our sample. The intuition is that small exporters are impossible to have a
substantial impact on the adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates. Moreover, we conduct
robustness checks about the roles of processing trade, product aggregation, bonded materials
and export size. All results are consistent.
This paper further studies the heterogeneity of the employment and wage effects in firm
productivity. Our results show that employment is more sensitive to the adjustments of
VAT rebates in the firms with lower productivity while the wage effect is insignificant and
indifferent between firms with different levels of productivity. Since our results suggest that
an increase in VAT rebates raises employment more in the firms with lower productivity, an
increase in VAT rebates may cause mis-allocation of resources. A policy implication is that
the government should take actions to mitigate the distortions when it considers increasing
the VAT rebates.
This paper contributes to the literature of export VAT rebates. The literature has mostly
focused on VAT rebates’ effects on exports. Theoretically, Feldstein and Krugman (1990)
show that a partial rebate on VAT makes non-refunded VAT act as an export tax. This export
tax is lower as the rate of VAT rebates becomes higher. As a result, VAT rebates are posi-
tively related to export. Chandra and Long (2013) provide firm-level evidence and Gourdon
et al. (2019) provide product-level evidence for this prediction. Braakmann et al. (2020)
provide additional evidence for this prediction with firm-product-level data. Tang et al.
(2019) study the impact of VAT rebates on firm productivity and find that firm productivity
is increased by higher rebates. There is also some literature explaining the motivations of
the adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates, e.g. environmental considerations (Song et al.,
2015; Gourdon et al., 2016; and Eisenbarth, 2017) and strategical support to downstream
sectors (Gourdon et al., 2016; and Garred, 2018). The present paper studies the employment
and wage effects of VAT rebates, providing a new dimension of the economic effects of VAT
rebates.
This paper also adds to the wider literature on the effects of trade policy on the labor
market. Trade liberalization has been found to be associated with the employment and
wage.5 In particular, Amiti and Davis (2012) theoretically and empirically show that the
effects of tariff reductions for both input and output on wage are subject to firm-specific
engagement into trade. They find that a fall in output tariffs decreases wages in import-
competing firms but increases wages in exporting firms. Moreover, they find that a fall in
5For example, see Attanasio et al. (2004), Trefler (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), LaRochelle-Côté



































































input tariffs increases wages in import-using firms relative to those at firms that only use
local inputs. Krishna et al. (2014) emphasize that the impact of tariff reductions on wage
is affected by the quality of matching between workers and firms. The impact of exchange
rate on the labor market has also been investigated by various studies.6 In particular, Dai
and Xu (2017) construct firm-specific exchange rate shocks and find a significant effect on
the labor reallocation across firms. Our paper also highlights the firm-specific shocks due to
the changes of trade policies and focuses on the trade policy of VAT rebates.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the background
and implementation of China’s export VAT rebates. We present the empirical strategy in
section 3 while describing the data in section 4. In section 5 we report the results of the
employment and wage effects of VAT rebates and robustness checks. In section 6, we study
the heterogeneity in firm productivity. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 China’s VAT rebates
2.1 Background
China started the policy of VAT rebates in 1994, in which exports were exempted from VAT
and the paid input VAT for the production of exports was fully refunded.7 The rates of
VAT rebates have been changed many times since 1994. At the beginning, the adjustments
were made in response to the heavy fiscal burden of the government and the rebates fraud.8
However, in the past two decades, the adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates generally
served two practical purposes.
The first and foremost purpose is to promote exports. As an export-promoting tool, the
rates of VAT rebates have been frequently adjusted when exports face negative shocks, in
particular, during the economic crisis. For example, after Asian financial crisis in 1997,
as China’s exports dropped, instead of depreciating Chinese currency to promote exports,
the rates of VAT rebates were adjusted more than 10 times in 1998 and 1999. During this
period, a large number of products received higher rates of VAT rebates. During 2008 and
2009, China’s exports were hit by the global financial crisis. Consequently, the rates of
6For example, see Campa and Goldberg (2001), Klein et al. (2003), Verhoogen (2008), Nucci and Pozzolo
(2010), Ekholm et al. (2012) and Dai and Xu (2017).
7Before 1994, China’s trade policy of rebates for exports was based on industrial and commercial standard
tax (“Gong Shang Tong Yi Shui” in Chinese).
8As documented by Cui (2003), the rebates from the government were increased by 150% to 75 billion
yuan in 1994, in which 30 billion yuan were deferred to 1995 due to the state’s budget constraint. To relieve
the heavy fiscal burden and solve the fraud problem, the rates of VAT rebates for most products were lowered



































































VAT rebates were increased for the products whose exports dropped most sharply, including
textiles, clothing, furniture, toys and electromechanical products.
The other purpose is to upgrade the structure of the economy. For example, from 2003 to
2007, the rates of VAT rebates were adjusted more than 10 times. The main aims of theses
adjustments were to reduce resource consumption and to reduce environmental pollution.
For example, in Fa Gai Jing Mao [2005] 1482 Hao and 2595 Hao9, the objectives of these
circulars are clearly described as “to control the exports of high energy-consuming, high
polluting and resource-based products”. Stated in these circulars, one of the measures was
to adjust the rates of VAT rebates of these products. Consequently, the adjustments from
2003 to 2007 were mainly reductions of the rates of VAT rebates for high energy-consuming
and high polluting products (e.g. steel and chemical products), and resource-based products
(e.g. rare earth metals, silicon and wooden products).
As this paper studies the employment and wage effects of VAT rebates, it is important to
exclude the adjustments that happened in response to (negative) export shocks. The reason
is that export shocks may also affect employment and wage through other channels than
affecting VAT rebates. If we do not have proper control for these channels, an endogeneity
issue will arise (we will discuss more on this problem in the identification issues discussed
in section 3). Thus, we select adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates from January 2003 to
December 2006, a period when the rates of VAT rebates were (officially) mainly adjusted to
reduce resource consumption and to reduce environmental pollution. This is supported by
Braakmann et al. (2020), who find that the adjustments during this period were not related to
export shocks, but related to product characteristics, such as whether the product is resource-
intensive, high-tech, pollutive and energy-consuming.
2.2 Implementation
The input VAT paid by firms for domestic sales is ultimately borne by consumers. Instead,
the paid input VAT for exports is fully or partially refunded by the government because
exports are exempted from VAT.10 The process of full VAT rebates is illustrated in figure
1. Suppose a firm uses the input of 100 dollars to produce one unit of a product for the
domestic sales. To purchase the input, the firm has to pay a VAT of 17%, i.e. 17 dollars. The
9Circular No. 1482 and 2595 were jointly issued by National Development and Reform Commission,
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Land and Resources, General Administration of
Customs, State Administration of Taxation and Ministry of Environmental Protection.
10The importing countries often impose VAT to the imports to ensure an equal competitiveness between




































































product is sold at 120 dollars plus a output VAT of 17%, i.e. 20.4 dollars. The firm will use
the output VAT, 20.4 dollars, to offset the input VAT, 17 dollars, and then pay the difference,
i.e. 3.4 dollars, to the government. For this transaction, all the input VAT paid by the firm is
finally borne by domestic consumers. The policy works differently for exporters. Suppose
the same firm exports the same product. Because exports are exempted from VAT, the firm
cannot collect output VAT from the importers in destinations. Therefore, the input VAT, i.e.
17 dollars, acts as a cost to the firm. Under the policy of VAT rebates, the firm can receive
rebates to cover the cost of input VAT from the government. As shown in figure 1, the firm
can receive the full value of input VAT, i.e. 17 dollars, from the government if the input VAT
is fully rebated.
Figure 1 about here
In practice, the process of VAT rebates is more complicated for two reasons. First, the
rebates are not always made in full. Take the above firm for example, the government may
rebate only a part of the value of input VAT, i.e. setting a lower rate of VAT rebates than the
rate of VAT. Second, for some inputs, firms do not have to pay VAT when purchasing them.
As a result, no rebates are given for these inputs. A typical example is bonded materials, for
which firms in China do not pay duty and VAT when importing them.
Formally, according to Circular No. 7 Cai Shui [2002], the VAT rebates from the gov-
ernment for the eligible firms, disregarding the domestic sales, are:
VAT Rebates = Input VAT − (Exports−BM)∗ (VAT −VAT R), (1)
where Input VAT is the value of VAT paid for the input that is used for the production of
exports. VAT and VAT R are the rate of VAT and rate of VAT rebates, e.g. 17% and 13%,
respectively. Exports denotes the value of eligible exports.11 BM denotes the value of
inputs which are exempted from VAT, typically the bonded materials. The expenditure on
these inputs is excluded from the export value for the purpose of calculating VAT rebates.
As shown in equation (1), if the rate of VAT rebates is equal to the rate of VAT, the
VAT rebates are equal to the value of input VAT. That is to say, the firm is fully refunded
of the paid VAT for the input used for the exports, which is the case illustrated in figure 1.
However, if the rate of VAT rebates of a product is less than the rate of VAT, the VAT rebates
are less than the value of input VAT, i.e. the value of input VAT is partially refunded. If
the calculated VAT rebates are negative, instead of receiving rebates from the government,
11As we explain in section 4.2, non-eligible exports are typically the exports under processing trade with



































































the firm has to pay VAT to the government. For example, if the value of input VAT is very
small and the value of exports is very large, the calculated VAT rebates can be negative. If
the calculated VAT rebates are -100, the firm has to pay 100 as the VAT to the government.
3 Empirical strategy
In this section, we provide a simple illustration on how firm’s employment is affected by
the changes in VAT rebates. Then we describe the empirical specifications to estimate the
employment and wage effects of VAT rebates.
3.1 A simple illustration
Suppose that the production of the exported product in a firm requires the labor l and the
input k. The wage rate and the price of the input are w and pk, respectively. The firm has to
pay VAT when purchasing the input. The value of input VAT is VAT (k). Assume that the
production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form:
q = ϕ · lβ k1−β (2)
where q is the output and ϕ is firm productivity. 0 < β < 1. The fixed cost of producing and
exporting the product is f . The firm’s profit exporting q units at the f.o.b. export price p is
then:
π = pq− (wl + pkk)− f −VAT (k)+VAT Rebates (3)
Combining the VAT rebates from equation (1) and ignoring the use of bonded materials,
the profit can be written as:
π = pq− (wl + pkk)− f −VAT (k)+(VAT (k)− pq · (VAT −VAT R)
= p(1−VAT +VAT R)q− (wl + pkk)− f
(4)
Equation (4) suggests that if the rate of VAT rebates is smaller than the rate of VAT, there
is a tax burden for exporters. More specifically, the non-refunded VAT, i.e. VAT −VAT R,
acts as an export tax, which is in line with Feldstein and Krugman (1990). This export tax is
lower as the rate of VAT rebates becomes higher. Therefore, the study of the impact of VAT
rebates on the labor market can shed light on the potential impact of export tax on the labor
market, on which the literature is very limited.



































































wl+ pkk by choosing labor l and inputs k given the output q described in equation (2), wage
w and the price of input pk. The second step is to maximize the profit by choosing the
export price p given the market demand. In the optimum of the first step, we can find firm’s






and the marginal cost of the firm with productivity ϕ as:
c =
wβ p1−βk
ϕβ β (1−β )1−β
(6)
The marginal cost is constant and not affected by VAT rebates. Therefore, the firm’s profit
exporting q units at the f.o.b. export price p can be rewritten as:
π = (p(1−VAT +VAT R)− c)q− f (7)
To solve the second step, a demand function is required. Assume that the demand in
foreign market is given as Ap−σ , where A is a demand parameter and σ is the elasticity. For
example, a CES preference can generate this demand function. Note that with such demand
function, the markup is constant. As a result, the pass-through of any adjustments of VAT
rebates is complete. We refrain from incomplete pass-through as we only aim at illustrating
how firm’s employment is related to VAT rebates. The iceberg-type variable trade cost is τ .
Therefore, the export price including the variable trade cost is τ p. As a result, the output
to satisfy the foreign demand is q = τA(τ p)−σ . Substituting this demand equation into the
profit equation (7), we can solve the optimal price p by maximizing the profit:
p =
σc
(σ −1)(1−VAT +VAT R)
(8)




(σ −1)(1−VAT +VAT R)
)−σ
(9)
Substituting equations (6) and (9) into equation (5), we have firm’s employment:
l =









































































)−σ p(1−β )(1−σ)k β 1−β+βσ
(1−β )(1−β )(1−σ) . As shown in equation (10), an increase in the rate of
VAT rebates raises firm’s employment. Therefore, firm’s employment is positively related
to VAT rebates.
3.2 Empirical specifications
To guide our empirical analysis on the employment effect of VAT rebates, we take the log-
arithm form of equation (10) and have ln l = f (VAT R, lnw, lnϕ, lnA, lnτ, lnδ ). Therefore,
our specification of the employment equation is:
ln lit = γ lFVAT Rit +ϑ l lnXit + ςi + ςt + εit (11)
where ln lit is the logarithm of employment, i.e. number of workers, of firm i in year t.
FVAT Rit is firm-specific rate of VAT rebates. Xit is a set of control variables. ςi represents
firm fixed effects, which control for all the firm-level time-invariant factors, e.g. ownership,
location and etc. ςt represents year fixed effects. εit is the error term. Later we will explain
how to construct firm-specific rate of VAT rebates and control variables. In addition to the
employment effect of VAT rebates, we estimate the following equation to investigate the
wage effect of VAT rebates:
lnwit = γwFVAT Rit +ϑ w lnYit + ςi + ςt + εit (12)
where lnwit is the logarithm of wage of firm i in year t. More specifically, the wage is
measured as the total wage bill divided by the employment. Yit is a set of control variables.
Firm-specific rate of VAT rebates
The rates of VAT rebates are set at the product level in practice. However, the data of em-
ployment and wage is collected at the firm level. Given a multi-product firm, it is hard to
infer the product-level employment and wage from the firm-level employment and wage.
Unfortunately, multi-product firms are prevalent (e.g. Bernard et al., 2010). Thus, we con-
struct the a firm-specific rate of VAT rebates and estimate the employment and wage effects
of VAT rebates at the firm level. The intuition behind the construction of firm-specific rates
of VAT rebates is as follows. On the one hand, different firms export different products
whose rates of VAT rebates may be adjusted differently; on the other hand, even when some
firms export the same mix of products, the share of each product in their export portfolio is



































































According to equation (1), if ignoring bonded materials,12 the value of VAT rebates of a
firm i in year t that exports a set of products Ωit is:








where Input VATit is the value of VAT that firm i pays for the input used for the production
of exports in year t. Exporti j,t is the value of eligible exports of product j of firm i in year t
and Exporti,t = ∑ j∈Ωit Exporti j,t is the value of eligible exports of firm i in year t. VAT R jt
is the rate of VAT rebates of product j in year t. For cases where the rates of VAT rebates of
some products are adjusted within a year, VAT R jt is constructed as the average of the rates
of VAT rebates of product in that year. The firm-specific rate of VAT rebates can be defined
as the second term in the bracket of the above equation, i.e. an export-weighted average of
the rates of VAT rebates across products:




VAT R jt . (13)
If the exported products have the same rates of VAT rebates, the firm-specific rate of VAT
rebates calculated as above is simply the rate of VAT rebates of the products.
However, the firm-specific rates of VAT rebates constructed in equation (13) could be
endogenous. On the one hand, when the rate of VAT rebates of a product is increased, the
export value of the product increases (e.g. Chandra and Long, 2013; Gourdon et al., 2019;
and Braakmann et al., 2020). As a result, the export weights may be correlated with the
rates of VAT rebates. If the export weights are positively correlated with the rates of VAT
rebates, there will be an upward bias in the firm-specific rate of VAT rebates.13 On the other
hand, the allocation of exports across products is an endogenous decision. For example,
high-quality products require skilled labor to produce (Verhoogen, 2008). Thus, the exports
of different products (with different quality) may be decided by firms’ skill intensity of
the employment. Another example is that the products within a firm usually have different
capital intensities (Ma et al., 2014) and consequently their exports may be decided by the
firm’s capital intensity.
To mitigate the endogeneity concern associated with the export weight, we follow Yu
(2015) to measure the export weight of each product using a firm’s initial year’s data in the
12We ignore the bonded materials when calculating firm-specific rates of VAT rebates in the main analysis.
In one of our robustness checks, we explain the reason and explicitly address this concern.
13The intuition is similar to the downward bias in the measurement of firm-specific tariff when using con-








































































VAT R jt (14)
With this method, the export weights are time-invariant. Therefore, the firm-specific rate of
VAT rebates is not correlated with the reallocation of exports across the products.
Control variables
In the employment equation (11), the control variables include firm wage, firm productivity,
firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-
added in total output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm
age. Firm wage corresponds to lnw in the model. Firm productivity, corresponding to lnϕ in
the model, is measured by value added per capita.14 Firm-level demand shocks in the foreign
market correspond to the parameter lnA in the model. We measure firm-level demand shocks















and GDPPCct are the total population and GDP per capita of county c in year t, respectively.
Cit is the set of countries that firm i exports to in year t. Exportic,t is the value of exports of
firm i to country c in year t and Exporti,t = ∑c∈Cit Exportic,t is the total value of exports of
firm i in year t. These two variables measure the population of the countries served by a firm








, in which Distct is the distance between country c
and China. Capital intensity and the share of value-added in total output are used to control
for the parameters of production function that are included in the δ of the model. As VAT
rebates are based on the eligible exports, we use the share of domestic sales in total sales
and the share of non-eligible exports in total exports to control for the impacts of domestic
sales and non-eligible exports.
The control variables in the wage equation (12) are selected to control for the factors
that affect how wages are set across firms. For example, a line of research suggests that
firms consider efficiency or fair wages as a mechanism to induce workers’ effort (e.g. Egger
and Kreickemeier, 2009; Davis and Harrigan, 2011; Amiti and Davis, 2012). Therefore, we
14The results are very robust when using total factor productivity (TFP) estimated from Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) approach in which materials are used to control for the unobservable productivity as a control variable.
In Appendix A.5, we also show the results with TFP estimated from Olley and Pakes (1996) approach in which
investment is used to control for the unobservable productivity as well as Ackerberg et al. (2015) approach.



































































include labor productivity, i.e. value-added per capita, in the specification.15 Another strand
of literature finds that search and matching frictions in the labor market result in bargaining
power of workers in the negotiation of wage (e.g. Davidson et al., 2008; Helpman and
Itskhoki, 2010; and Helpman et al., 2010). Therefore, we add control variables measuring
the characteristics of local labor market where the firm is located, including unemployment
rate, labor market tightness, and labor market matching efficiency. More specifically, we
calculate the ratio between job vacancies and job seekers that are registered in the careers
services, as an indication of labor market tightness. The labor market matching efficiency
is measured by the share of placed job-seekers in total job-seekers registered in the careers
services. These labor market characteristics have been considered as important factors when
workers negotiate wages with employers (e.g. Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010; and Helpman
et al., 2010). All other control variables used in the employment equation (11) are also
included in the estimation of the wage equation.
Identification issues
The key parameters of interest are γ l and γw, which capture the employment and wage
effects of VAT rebates respectively. The estimation of γ l and γw could be biased due to
the potential endogeneity of FVAT Rit . When calculating FVAT Rit with the initial export
share, the only source of changes in FVAT Rit is the changes in product-level rates of VAT
rebates. However, the changes in product-level rates of VAT rebates can be endogenous.
For example, a number of changes in the rates of VAT rebates are responses to the export
shocks during economic crisis, e.g. Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial
crisis in 2008. The endogeneity issue arises if these export shocks affect firm’s employment
and wage through other channels that are not controlled for. For example, Chodorow-Reich
(2014) and Popov and Rocholl (2018) show that credit market disruptions due to economic
crisis have considerable effects on the firm’s employment. Dai and Xu (2017) show that
exchange rate shocks affect firm’s employment significantly. Apparently, export shocks
may be accompanied by credit market disruptions during economic crisis and exchange rate
shocks, thereby affecting firm’s employment. As a result, the estimated employment and
wage effects of VAT rebates will be subject to a downward bias.16
However, the impact of this source of endogeneity on our estimation should be fairly
minor. The reason is that we select the period from January 2003 to December 2006 in
15The results are robust if we control for total factor productivity as in the employment equation.
16More specifically, the rates of VAT rebates are usually increased in response to the negative export shocks.
Therefore, the estimated (positive) effect of VAT rebates is offset by the negative effect of credit market dis-



































































our sample. During this period, the adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates were aimed
at upgrading the economy structure, optimizing natural resource consumption and reducing
environmental pollution. These objectives are clearly stated in the official circulars, which
have been discussed in section 2. As documented by Braakmann et al. (2020), the adjust-
ments during this period were indeed related to product characteristics, such as whether
the product is resource-intensive, high-tech, pollutive and energy-consuming; but were un-
related to various measures of export shocks. Therefore, the changes in the rates of VAT
rebates in our analysis are plausibly exogenous.
4 Data
Our study draws on three main sources of disaggregated data: product-level rates of VAT
rebates, transaction-level trade and firm-level production.
4.1 Rate of VAT rebates
Firstly, we collect the rates pf VAT rebates of all products after the last adjustment in our
sample period, i.e. September 2006, from the website of Minister of Commerce.17 Secondly,
we collect all the circulars on the adjustments of VAT rebates between January 2003 and
December 2006 in SAT Taxation Law Database.18 These circulars state the changes of the
rates of VAT rebates for the adjusted products. Since our data on exports is at 8-digit HS
level, we drop the few 8-digit HS products that have different rates of VAT rebates or the
adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates at 10-digit or 11-digit HS level. With this exercise,
we have monthly rates of VAT rebates for 7,308 8-digit HS products from 2003 to 2006.
In our sample, around 1,800 (240) products experienced negative (positive) adjustments
of VAT rebates. In total, the rates of 28% of products, i.e. 2,055 products, were adjusted.
Among them, around 100 products were adjusted more than once.19 The changes in the rate
of VAT rebates were between -17 percentage points and 13 percentage points. As shown in
figure 2, most (around 40%) of the changes are the reductions in the rate of VAT rebates by
2 percentage points, which involves around 900 products. The second most (around 20%)
of the changes are the reductions by 13 percentage points involving around 450 products.
The third and fourth most (around 15% and 8%) of the changes are the reductions by 5
17http://cws.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/200703/1174376723900.xls accessible on 15 August 2017.
18See Appendix A.1 for details.
19More specifically, 1,949 products, 85 products, 18 products and 3 products were adjusted once, twice,



































































percentage points involving around 330 products and the increases by 4 percentage points
involving around 180 products, respectively. The fifth most (around 6%) of the changes are
the reductions by 8 percentage points involving around 140 products. Compared with the
maximum rate of VAT rebates, 17%, these changes were substantial. For most adjustments,
the period between the announcement and the time of these adjustments coming into effect
varied from one day to ten days. This indicates that the anticipation effects, i.e. firms
adjusting employment and wage in anticipation of adjustments coming into effect, are highly
unlikely.20
Figure 2 about here
4.2 Transaction-level trade
Our export transactions are from Chinese Customs Trade Database (CCTD) collected by
the General Administration of Customs of China. This database reports export (and import)
values and quantities by product-firm-destination (source country for imports) at a monthly
frequency. Moreover, the trade mode is recorded for every transaction. There are three
major trade modes, i.e. “processing trade with purchased materials (PTPM)”, “processing
trade with supplied materials (PTSM)” and “ordinary trade (OT)”, which account for more
than 90 percent of the exports.21 Under PTPM, firms purchase materials from abroad as
an input used in the production of exports. During the process, firms have to pay input
VAT for the materials from abroad. Therefore, the exports under PTPM are eligible for
VAT rebates. However, under PTSM, firms are supplied with the materials from abroad and
mainly conduct assembly work. During the process, firms do not pay any input VAT for the
supplied materials and only get assembly fees after shipping the output abroad. Therefore,
exports under PTSM are not eligible for VAT rebates. We use eligible exports, i.e. exports
under OT and PTPM, to construct firm-specific rates of VAT rebates. We clean the data by
dropping observations with missing values on any of the following variables: product HS
code, firm name, export value and export quantity.
4.3 Firm-level production
The firm-level production data comes from Chinese annual survey of manufacturing firms
(CASMF) collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. There are around 100
20The adjustments in January 2004 were an exception, for which the time gap is 75 days as shown in table
A1 in Appendix A.1. However, Braakmann et al. (2020) explicitly test the possible anticipation effects of these
adjustments and find no evidence of anticipation effects.



































































thousand firms in 1999 to 410 thousand firms in 2008. The survey records information on
firm’s employment and wage. The survey also records firm-level data on asset, intermediate
input, sales, exports and etc. We clean the data by dropping observations that satisfy any
of the following criteria: (1) missing values on firm name or duplicated firm name in each
year; (2) missing values or non-positive values on firm employment and total wage bill; (3)
non-positive values of sales and total asset; (4) export value larger than total sales; (5) fixed
asset or variable asset larger than total asset.
4.4 Merged data
To construct firm-specific rates of VAT rebates, we merge product-level rates of VAT rebates
and transaction-level trade to get detailed information on the exports for each exporter, in-
cluding the products exported and exports for each product. This exercise provides us a
sample of around 87,000 exporters in 2003 and around 160,000 exporters in 2006. Then,
we merge it with the production-level data to get the sample for the empirical regression.22
In the merged data, we have around 27,000 firms in 2003 and around 51,000 firms in
2006. On average, The merged data accounts for 35% of exporters and nearly 50% of export
value in CCTD. It also accounts for 58% of exporters and 67% of export value in the cleaned
CASMF. Moreover, the merged data contains more than 50% of the sales, employment and
asset of exporters in the cleaned CASMF. As a comparison, in the merged data of Yu (2015),
40% of the exporters and 53% of the export value in CASMF are covered. Therefore, our
merged data is very comparable to Yu (2015).
5 Results
5.1 Baseline results
The results on the employment and wage effects of VAT rebates are reported in table 1.23
As shown in columns (3) and (4) of panel A, the employment effect becomes significantly
positive as we include firm and year fixed effects. Our preferred specification from equation
(11) with control variables is shown in column (4), in which the coefficient of FVAT R is sig-
nificantly positive at the value of 0.236. This suggests that a one percentage point decrease
22The details of the merged data, including the number of firms and the description of merging quality for
each year, and the descriptive statistics of the data used for our regressions are presented in Appendix A.2.
23The full tables on the employment and wage effects, showing the coefficients of all control variables, are



































































(increase) of firm-specific rate of VAT rebates significantly reduces (raises) employment by
0.236%.
However, as shown in columns (3) and (4) of panel B, the wage effect of VAT rebates is
not significant when including firm and year fixed effects. Our preferred specification from
equation (12) with control variables is presented in column (4). The coefficient is very small
and statistically insignificant, suggesting VAT rebates have no significant impact on firm’s
average wage. Combining the employment and wage effects together, we find that firms
receiving higher (lower) VAT rebates employ more (less) workers but do not pay higher or
lower average wage. This is probably because China had a big labor pool during the period
in our sample. As a result, firms can expand the employment without paying higher wage.
Table 1 about here
To understand the scale of the employment effect, we calculate firms’ employment
growth from the initial year to the last year in our sample and the adjustments of em-
ployment induced by the changes in VAT rebates. The employment growth is calculated
as ∆ ln l from the initial year to the last year. The adjustments of employment induced by
the changes in VAT rebates are calculated in two steps. Firstly, we calculate the change
in the firm-specific rate of VAT rebates for each firm from the initial year to the last year,
∆FVAT R. Secondly, we apply the estimated coefficients of FVAT R to calculate adjustments
of employment induced by the changes in VAT rebates, i.e. 0.236×∆FVAT R. On average,
the employment growth for the firms whose VAT rebates are changed in our sample is 7.3%.
There is an overall decrease in the rates of VAT rebates during this period, thereby reducing
employment by 0.26%. Therefore, the changes in VAT rebates reduce employment growth
by around 3.6%.24 This indicates that the changes in VAT rebates are a important factor
affecting firm’s employment.
There are two potential explanations of the employment effect of VAT rebates. The first
explanation is about exports: higher VAT rebates give rise to the increase of export quantity
and price, requiring firms to employ more labor. There has been evidence in the literature
that higher VAT rebates raise export quantity (e.g. Chandra and Long, 2013; Gourdon et al.,
2019; and Braakmann et al., 2020). In Appendix A.4, we estimate the effects of firm-specific
rate of VAT rebates on firm’s exports using our firm-level data. Indeed, we find higher VAT
rebates significantly increase firm’s export value, export quantity and export price (firm’s
24Note that the change in firm-specific rate of VAT rebates is smaller than the product-level changes in the
rate of VAT rebates. Using the changes in the product-level rates as shown in figure 2, the employment effect



































































export value divided by export quantity).25 The second potential explanation is about fi-
nancial constraints. Financial constraints have been considered an important factor when
firms make decisions in the labor market (e.g. Michelacci and Quadrini, 2005; Caggese and
Cuñat, 2008; Borisov et al., 2015; Falato and Liang, 2016; and Benmelech et al., 2019).
The increases in VAT rebates essentially represent cash flows back to firms, potentially re-
laxing firms’ financial constraints and enabling them to adjust their employment. This is
relevant in the context of China given the tight financial constraints faced by many Chinese
exporters (e.g. Manova and Yu, 2016). In Appendix A.4, we show that an increase of VAT
rebates indeed raises firms’ liquidity and decreases firm’s leverage, suggesting that higher
VAT rebates make firms become less financially constrained.
5.2 Robustness check
In this section, we present some robustness checks of the employment and wage effects.
5.2.1 Alternative export share
In the main analysis, we use initial export share of each product to calculate firm-specific
rate of VAT rebates. The idea is that the time-invariant export share is not correlated with
any contemporaneous shocks on firm’s employment and wage. As a robustness check, we
use the mean export share of each product from the initial year to the last year in our sample,
which is also time-variant, to calculate firm-specific rate of VAT rebates. The employment
and wage effects are presented in column (1) of table 2, respectively. The results are very
robust. Moreover, we use lagged export share of each product by one year and two years,
which are not correlated with contemporaneous shocks, to calculate firm-specific rate of
VAT rebates. The results are presented in columns (2)-(3) of table 2, respectively. Again,
they are consistent with the main results.
5.2.2 Product entry and exit
In our calculation of firm-specific rate of VAT rebates, the initial export share is not available
for the products that are newly added by a firm after the initial year. Moreover, if a firm
drops products after the initial year, the initial export shares of the survival products cannot
be used. Therefore, for the firms that add or drop products after the initial year, it is not
feasible to use the initial export share to calculate firm-specific rate of VAT rebates. Here,
25If we consider export price as a proxy of export quality, the result suggests that firms may upgrade export



































































we provide a robustness check on this issue. For every firm, we construct its product mix
that consists of all products exported from the initial year to the last year in our sample.
Then, the export shares of the products that are not exported in a year are treated as zero.
For example, if a firm exports $ 400 of product A and $ 600 of product B in 2003 and exports
$ 500 of product A and $ 500 of product C in 2004, the product mix of this firm consists of
A, B and C. The export shares of A, B and C are 40%, 60% and 0% in 2003, and are 50%,
0% and 50% in 2004. Again, we use the initial export share to calculate firm-specific rate
of VAT rebates and use mean export share to calculate an alternative firm-specific rate of
VAT rebates. The employment and wage effects are presented in columns (4) and column
(6) of table 2, respectively. They are very consistent with the main results. Additionally,
we check the results controlling for product entry and exit. More specifically, we include a
dummy variable to denote whether the firm drops a product and a dummy variable to denote
whether the firm adds a product in the control variables. The employment and wage effects
are presented in columns (5) and (7). The results are again consistent with the main results.
Table 2 about here
5.2.3 Small exporters
As a safeguard to the exogenous adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates in our sample, we
estimate the effects using a sample of small exporters. The intuition is that small exporters
are impossible to have an impact on the adjustments of the product-level rates of VAT re-
bates. We construct the sample of small exporters using two methods. In the first method,
a small exporter is a firm whose export share of every product, i.e. the firm’s export value
of the product out of the total export value of the product, is less than 5%. The results are
shown in column (1) of table 3. They are very consistent with the main results. In the second
method, a small exporter is a firm whose total export value is below the 20th percentile in
the firms in the same sector. The results are shown in column (2). The results are consistent
with the main results.
5.2.4 Processing Trade
As described in section 4.2, exports under PTPM and OT are both eligible for VAT rebates.
However, as discussed in Manova and Yu (2016), the exporting behavior of firms conducting
PTPM is different from firms conducting OT. To attenuate the concern that the employment
and wage effects of VAT rebates may be affected by PTPM, we investigate the effects by ex-



































































(3) of table 3. The employment effect is significantly positive while the wage effect is not
significant.
5.2.5 Product aggregation
The rate of VAT rebates for exports is set and changed at 8-digit HS product level. It is inter-
esting to study whether the product aggregation affects the employment and wage effects.26
As a robustness check, we aggregate the data at 6-digit HS product level. More specifically,
we calculate 6-digit HS product level rate of VAT rebates as the average of the rates across
all sub-8-digit HS products and use the initial export share of each 6-digit HS product to
calculate firm-specific rate of VAT rebates. The results are presented in column (4) of table
3 and are consistent with the main results.27
5.2.6 Bonded material
As shown in section 2.2, bonded materials should be excluded from the value of exports
when calculating VAT rebates. However, in the main analysis we ignore bonded materials
when calculating firm-specific rate of VAT rebates. The main reason is that only a small
portion of firms use bonded materials in our sample. For those firms using bonded materials,
the value of bonded materials is usually small relative to the value of exports. Moreover,
we do not observe how bonded materials are used across products within a firm. Here, we
provide a robustness check assuming that bonded materials are used within the same 8-digit
HS product. Since we observe the bmi jt for each 8-digit HS product j of firm i in year
t, we can easily exclude them from exports. Therefore, we use xi jt − bmi jt to replace xi jt
when calculating firm-specific rate of VAT rebates. The results of the employment and wage
effects are reported in column (5) of table 3, and are similar to the main results.28
5.2.7 Export size
As domestic sales are not eligible for VAT rebates, it is crucial to control for the importance
of exports for each firm. For example, a firm with a large (small) change in firm-specific
26For example, Gourdon et al. (2019) estimate the effect of rebates on exports at 6-digit HS product level.
The aggregation is also able to partly alleviate the issue of product entry and exit.
27The employment and wage effects based on the aggregation at 4-digit HS product level are also very
consistent.
28We have also checked the results assuming that bonded materials are used within the same 6-digit (4-digit)
HS product. We first aggregate bonded materials at 6-digit (4-digit) HS product level for every firm and then
allocate bonded materials to 8-digit HS products according to their export shares in total 6-digit (4-digit) HS



































































rate of VAT rebates could have a very small (large) amount of export. Then, the employment
and wage effects of VAT rebates may be small (large) on this firm. In the main analysis, we
have dealt with this problem using the share of domestic sales in total sales as one of the
control variables. Therefore, the employment and wage effects are estimated by comparing
firms with a similar level of exports. To further provide robustness checks on this issue, we
scale firm-specific rate of VAT rebates by multiplying it with the initial share of exports in
total sales.29 With the scaled firm-specific rate of VAT rebates, export size of firms is taken
into consideration. The results are reported in column (6) of table 3. Again, the employment
effect is significantly positive while the wage effect is not significant.
Table 3 about here
5.2.8 Other robustness checks
Our estimation may be affected by the selection bias due to firm’s exit from foreign markets.
The bias arises when decision to exit is affected by VAT rebates. For example, even condi-
tional on the control variables and fixed effects used in equations (11) and (12), a firm with
higher VAT rebates may export strategically just to reap VAT rebates. In this case, firms
with higher VAT rebates are more likely to survive in the foreign market. Following Olley
and Pakes (1996), we address this potential bias by modeling the probability to survive in
the foreign market as a function of observed variables and using the predicted probability
to survive as an additional control variable to estimate the employment and wage effects.
Another practical concern is that it may take time for the employment and wage to adjust
to the changes in VAT rebates. There is also a concern about the reverse causality between
employment/wage and VAT rebates as the initial year’s export weights may be affected by
the initial year’s employment and wage. To attenuate these concerns, we investigate the
effects of lagged firm-specific rate of VAT rebates by one year on the contemporaneous em-
ployment and wage. Moreover, we estimate the employment (wage) effect by excluding the
outliers whose employment (wage) is at the top 5% or the bottom 5% of all firms in each
sector. The results are presented in Appendix A.5 and are consistent with the main results.
6 Heterogeneity in firm productivity
Firm productivity has been a very important dimension of heterogeneity in the literature of
international trade. In this section, we investigate whether the employment and wage effects
29It is equivalent to replace the initial export share of each product in firm total export with the initial export



































































are heterogeneous across firms with different levels of productivity.
We firstly estimate firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) using Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) approach in which materials are used to control for the unobserved productivity.30
Then, we use firms’ TFP at their initial year to divide the sample into two groups: low-
productivity firms and high-productivity firms. More specifically, within each sector, the
firms with productivity lower than the median value are classified as low-productivity firms
while the rest firms high-productivity firms.31 Finally, we estimate the employment and
wage effects for each group.
The results are presented in columns (1) and (2) of table 4. As shown in panel A, the
coefficient of FVAT R in the employment equation is significantly positive at 0.313 in low-
productivity firms and not significant in high-productivity firms. This suggests that a one
percentage point decrease (increase) in firm-specific rate of VAT rebates reduces (raises)
low-productivity firms’ employment by 0.313% while having no statistically significant im-
pact on high-productivity firms’ employment. As shown in panel B, the wage effect is not
significant in both low-productivity and high-productivity firms. In Appendix A.6, we re-
port the robustness checks with TFP estimated from various methods, including Olley and
Pakes (1996) approach and Ackerberg et al. (2015) approach. In all these measures of firm
productivity, the pattern about the heterogeneity of the employment and wage effects in firm
productivity holds.
To provide further evidence on the heterogeneity in firm productivity, we estimate equa-
tions (11) and (12) with an interaction term between firm-specific rate of VAT rebate and
the values of firms’ TFP. Firstly, we use firms’ TFP in their initial year. The results are pre-
sented in column (3) of table 4. As shown in panel A, the coefficient of the interaction term
is significantly negative in the employment equation while being insignificant in the wage
equation as shown in panel B. Secondly, we use firms’ TFP in 2003. The results are pre-
sented in column (4). Again, the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative
in the employment equation but not significant in the wage equation. Thirdly, we use firms’
contemporaneous TFP. As shown in column (5), the results are very consistent: the coef-
ficient of the interaction term is significantly negative (not significant) in the employment
(wage) equation. These results suggest that the employment effect is larger in the firms with
lower productivity while the wage effect is insignificant and indifferent between firms with
different levels of productivity.32 This finding is consistent with the previous specification
30We use sector-wide price index as in Brandt et al. (2012) to deflate the value of output, capital and material.
31It is worth noting that VAT rebates may have an impact on firms’ TFP (Tang et al., 2019). Therefore, the
changes in VAT rebates may affect firms’ classification of groups. As a result, we use TFP at the initial year to
address this issue. The results are very robust when using the TFP in the first year, i.e. 2003, to classify firms.



































































that firms are divided into low-productivity and high-productivity firms. As a result, an im-
plication to policymakers is that when considering a decrease of VAT rebates, it is important
to provide support to low-productivity firms to mitigate the negative effect on employment.
Table 4 about here
Our analysis consistently suggests that the employment is more sensitive to the adjust-
ments of VAT rebates in the firms with lower productivity. In our sample period, there is an
overall decrease in VAT rebates. Therefore, employment is reduced more in the firms with
lower productivity. The possible explanation to this heterogeneity is that firms with lower
productivity are less capable of passing through the negative shocks, i.e. the decrease of VAT
rebates, to consumers (i.e. the importers in the foreign countries), thereby having to absorb
more of the shocks internally and reducing the employment more. This is consistent with
the findings in Braakmann et al. (2020) that smaller exporters and exporter charging lower
prices (which tend to be less productive in China) have very limited abilities to increase
export price when receiving lower VAT rebates. The lower abilities to pass through shocks
to consumers in firms with lower productivity are also consistent with the theoretical mod-
els of endogenous markup and incomplete pass through of shocks in trade literature (e.g.
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; and Berman et al., 2012). Moreover, since our results suggest
that an increase in VAT rebates raises employment more in firms with lower productivity, an
increase in VAT rebates may cause mis-allocation of resources.
7 Conclusion
VAT rebates are a commonly used trade policy. This paper studies the employment and
wage effects of VAT rebates using a comprehensive Chinese firm-product-level data set.
The paper highlights the role of firm-level heterogeneity when firms are exposed to product-
level adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates. Our results show that higher VAT rebates
raise firm’s employment while having no impact on firm’s average wage. Moreover, we
find significant heterogeneity of the employment effect across firms with different levels of
productivity. In particular, an increase of VAT rebates raises employment more in the firms
with lower productivity. This suggests that the policy of increasing VAT rebates may distort
the factor market and lead to inefficient use of resources. A policy implication is that the
government should take actions to mitigate the distortions when it considers increasing the
VAT rebates.
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Table 1: The employment and wage effects of VAT rebates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: ln employment
FVAT R 0.128 0.041 0.283 0.236
(0.087) (0.076) (0.088)*** (0.077)***
Ad j.R2 0.918 0.940 0.920 0.942
# observations 97,115 97,115 97,115 97,115
Panel B: ln wage
FVAT R -0.676 -0.381 -0.060 -0.027
(0.101)*** (0.093)*** (0.092) (0.091)
Ad j.R2 0.557 0.637 0.615 0.654
# observations 93,362 93,362 93,362 93,362
Controls NO YES NO YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects NO NO YES YES
The control variables in the employment equation include firm wage, value added per capita, firm-level
demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output,
the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. The control variables in the
wage equation include firm employment, value added per capita, unemployment rate, labor market tight-
ness, labor market matching efficiency, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital
intensity, the share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible
exports and firm age. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point



































































Table 2: Robustness checks on alternative export share and product entry and exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean Lag 1 Lag 2 Initial Initial Mean Mean
Panel A: ln employment
FVAT R 0.236 0.224 0.228 0.422 0.405 0.393 0.359
(0.078)*** (0.078)*** (0.079)*** (0.060)*** (0.078)*** (0.066)*** (0.075)***
Ad j.R2 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.943 0.962 0.943 0.962
# observations 95,372 95,236 94,681 130,472 69,773 130,472 69,773
Panel B: ln wage
FVAT R -0.044 -0.048 -0.038 -0.037 0.041 -0.063 0.019
(0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.072) (0.098) (0.077) (0.094)
Ad j.R2 0.654 0.654 0.654 0.668 0.699 0.668 0.699
# observations 91,683 91,546 91,009 126,042 62,847 126,042 62,847
Product entry/exit —- —- —- NO YES NO YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
In columns (1)-(3), we use alternative export share to calculate firm-specific rate of VAT rebates: the mean
export share from the initial year to the last year, the export share lagged by one year and the export share
lagged by two years. In columns (4)-(7), we consider product entry and exit within firms. We construct every
firm’s product mix that consists of all products exported from the initial year to the last year in our sample
and use the initial export share of each product (columns (4)-(5)) and mean export share from the initial year
to last year (columns (6)-(7)) to calculate firm-specific rate of VAT rebates. ”Product entry/exit” indicates a
dummy variable to denote whether the firm drops a product and a dummy variable to denote whether the firm
adds a product. The control variables in the employment equation include firm wage, value added per capita,
firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total
output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. The control variables in the
wage equation include firm employment, value added per capita, unemployment rate, labor market tightness,
labor market matching efficiency, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity,
the share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm
age. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and *



































































Table 3: Robustness checks on small exporters, processing trade, product aggregation,
bonded materials and export size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Small Small Ordinary Aggregation Bonded Export
exporter exporter trade 6-digit HS Material size
Panel A: ln employment
FVAT R 0.219 0.261 0.457 0.214 0.237 0.279
(0.085)** (0.101)*** (0.155)*** (0.078)*** (0.077)*** (0.103)***
Ad j.R2 0.936 0.941 0.938 0.942 0.942 0.942
# observations 82,394 14,147 51,562 94,494 97,106 97,115
Panel B: ln wage
FVAT R -0.043 0.075 0.091 -0.041 -0.025 -0.124
(0.098) (0.136) (0.166) (0.093) (0.090) (0.113)
Ad j.R2 0.631 0.680 0.664 0.652 0.653 0.654
# observations 79,267 13,542 49,574 90,787 93,370 93,362
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
In columns (1) and (2), we use the sample of small exporters: defined as firms whose export share for each
HS 8-digit product out of total export value of the product is less than 5% and as firms whose total export
value is below the 20th percentile in the firms in the same sector. In column (3), we use the sample of firms
that only conduct ordinary trade. In column (4), we aggregate the trade data at 6 digit HS level and then
calculate firm-specific rate of VAT rebates. In column (5), we exclude bonded materials from export value.
In column (6) , we use the firm-specific rate of VAT rebates scaled by the initial share of exports in total
sales. The control variables in the employment equation include firm wage, value added per capita, firm-
level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output,
the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. The control variables in the wage
equation include firm employment, value added per capita, unemployment rate, labor market tightness, labor
market matching efficiency, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the
share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm
age. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and



































































Table 4: The heterogeneity of the employment and wage effects in firm productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low High All All All
Panel A: ln employment
FVAT R 0.313 0.122 0.739 0.874 0.993
(0.103)*** (0.114) (0.262)*** (0.314)*** (0.291)***
TFP initial ×FVAT R -0.135
(0.067)**
TFP 2003 ×FVAT R -0.188
(0.083)**




Ad j.R2 0.909 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.944
# observations 48,930 48,185 97,115 54,349 97,115
Panel B: ln wage
FVAT R -0.015 -0.073 0.513 0.062 0.194
(0.120) (0.138) (0.450) (0.635) (0.379)
TFP initial ×FVAT R -0.149
(0.124)
TFP 2003 ×FVAT R -0.045
(0.176)




Ad j.R2 0.611 0.670 0.653 0.658 0.653
# observations 47,160 46,202 93,362 52,699 93,362
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
In columns (1) and (2) we use firms with low initial productivity and firms with high initial productivity,
respectively. In columns (3)-(5) we introduce interaction terms between firm-specific rate of VAT rebates
and initial productivity, productivity in 2003 and contemporaneous productivity. Note that in columns
(3) and (4), the coefficients of initial productivity and productivity in 2003 are absorbed by firm fixed
effects. The control variables in the employment equation include firm wage, value added per capita,
firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in
total output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. The control
variables in the wage equation include firm employment, value added per capita, unemployment rate,
labor market tightness, labor market matching efficiency, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable
trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic sales, the share
of non-eligible exports and firm age. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses




































































A.1 Adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates
There were four major adjustments during this period: the adjustments in January 2004, May
2005, January 2006 and September 2006. More specifically, 365 products, 94 products, 137
products and 1,497 products received different rates of VAT rebates at these time points
respectively. Table A1 reports the descriptive statistics of these major adjustments. For the
adjustments at other times, fewer than 40 products were affected.
Table A 1: Major adjustments of the rates of VAT rebates between 2003 and 2006
Circular Title Adjustment Number Adjustment Number
Cai Shui [2003] 222 Hao -17 1 -15 5
Release on 13/10/2003 -13 213 -12 8
Effective from 01/01/2004 -10 25 -8 44
-7 3 -5 45
-2 3 8 18
Cai Shui [2005] 75 Hao -13 6 -8 2
Release on 29/04/2005 -5 45 -3 11
Effective from 01/05/2005 -2 25 +3 5
Cai Shui [2005] 184 Hao -13 67 -8 16
Release on 23/12/2005 -5 27 -3 24
Effective from 01/01/2006 +5 1 +11 1
+13 1
Cai Shui [2006] 139 Hao -13 136 -11 30
Release on 14/09/2006 -8 64 -5 210
Effective from 15/09/2006 -4 2 -2 881
+2 2 +4 140
+8 32
Source: The Taxation Law Database of State Administration of Taxation,
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn. “-” means that the rates of VAT rebates are reduced and
“+” means that the rates of VAT rebates are increased. ”Number” means number of
products.
The Circulars from 2003 to 2006 include: Cai Shui [2003] 222 Hao, Cai Shui Ming Dian
[2004] 1 Hao, Cai Shui Ming Dian [2004] 2 Hao, Cai Shui Ming Dian [2004] 3 Hao, Cai
Shui [2004] 200 Hao, Cai Shui [2004] 201 Hao, Cai Shui [2004] 214 Hao, Cai Shui [2004]
224 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 51 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 57 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 75 Hao, Cai
Shui [2005] 93 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 119 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 133 Hao, Cai Shui [2005]
184 Hao, Cai Shui [2006] 6 Hao, Cai Shui [2006] 42 Hao, Cai Shui [2006] 139 Hao, Cai





































































Processing trade with purchased materials (PTPM), also known as import-assembly trade,
refers to “business activities in which the operating enterprise imports materials/parts by
paying foreign exchange for their processing and exports finished processed products for
sale abroad”. Processing trade with supplied materials (PTSM), also known as pure assem-
bly trade, refers to “the business activities in which the imported materials are supplied by
the overseas enterprise, and the operating enterprise need not pay foreign exchange for the
import, but just carries out processing or assembling in accordance with the requirements
of the overseas enterprise, and charges for the processing, with the finished products being
marketed by the overseas enterprise”. These definitions come from Order No.113 of the
General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China “Measures of the
Customs of the People’s Republic of China on the Supervision of Processing Trade Goods”.
A.2.2 Merge data
In the main paper, we have discussed the criteria to clean the CASMF: (1) missing values on
firm name or duplicated firm name in each year; (2) missing values or non-positive values on
firm employment and wage bills; (3) non-positive values of sales and total asset; (4) export
value larger than sales; (5) fixed asset or variable asset larger than total asset. In table A2,
we present the number of firms after cleaning the data from CASMF after these criteria. In
total around 1.5% firms are dropped in 2003 and 2004 and around 1% firms are dropped in
2005 and 2006. Finally, we have around 192,000 firms in 2003 and 298,000 firms in 2006.
Among them, around 51,000 firms are exporters in 2003 and 79,000 firms are exporters
in 2006. In the sample combining CCTD and product-level rate of VAT rebates, we have
around 87,000 exporters in 2003 and 160,000 exporters in 2006.
To merge the sample of exporters after combining Chinese Customs Trade Database
(CCTD) with product-level VAT rebates and the firm-level production data comes from Chi-
nese annual survey of manufacturing firms (CASMF), we mainly rely on firm name. Though
there is a unique identifier code for each firm in the CASMF and CCTD, but it is generated
according to different coding systems. Therefore it cannot be used to merge the two data.
In some firm names, there are brackets that use Chinese and western style respectively in
the two data sources. In the merged sample, we have around 27,000 exporters in 2003 and
51,000 exporters in 2006.It should be noted that in CASMF, all firms are manufacturing



































































rectly and above-scale exporters trading with agents. In CCTD, firms can be divided into
above-scale exporters trading directly, trading agents, small-scale manufacturing exporters
and non manufacturing exporters. Thus, only the above-scale exporters trading directly are
merged (e.g. see Wang and Yu, 2012).
Table A 2: The process of merging data
CASMF CCTD and
(1) +(2) +(3) +(4) +(5) VAT rebates Merged
Year Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms Exporters Exporters sample
2003 196,102 194,483 192,710 192,710 192,705 50,831 87,481 26,721
2004 276,410 274,340 272,282 272,282 272,274 76,903 106,618 42,605
2005 271,738 270,105 269,176 269,174 269,151 75,514 113,474 43,966
2006 301,849 299,508 298,824 298,824 298,765 79,150 159,697 51,073
The quality of merged data is described in table A3. On average, the merged data ac-
counts for 35% of exporters and nearly 50% of export value in CCTD . It also accounts for
58% of exporters and 67% of export value in the cleaned CASMF. Moreover, the merged
data contains more than 50% of the sales, employment and asset of exporters in the cleaned
CASMF.
Table A 3: The quality of merged data
CCTD and VAT rebates Exporters in CASMF
Year Number Exports Number Exports Sales Employment Asset
2003 30.54% 41.46% 52.57% 60.23% 52.23% 49.47% 48.69%
2004 39.96% 52.16% 55.40% 69.57% 59.34% 56.10% 57.28%
2005 38.75% 51.61% 58.22% 67.53% 56.87% 55.26% 54.30%
2006 31.98% 47.62% 64.53% 70.84% 59.44% 58.01% 56.39%
Mean 35.31% 48.21% 57.68% 67.04% 56.97% 54.71% 54.17%
A.2.3 Description of regression sample
In table A4, we describe how we process the merged data to get the sample used in the
estimations of the employment and wage effects. The number of firms in each year in the
merged sample is presented in column (1), which is the same as the number in the last col-
umn of table A2. After dropping around 10,000 observations with missing values in the
control variables used in the estimations of the employment effect (see table A5 for the
variables), we have around 153,900 observations as shown in column (2). Then we drop



































































have around 125,500 observations as shown in column (3). These dropped observations
are mainly those firms with product entry and exit after the initial year. Among the left
observations, there are firms that are only present in a single year as shown in column (4).
These firms either exit the market in 2004 (singleton observations in 2003), or only survive
one year (singleton observations in 2004 and 2005), or new exporters (singleton observa-
tions in 2006). As we use panel data method, we essentially use the within-firm variations.
Therefore, these observations are dropped automatically in the estimations. Therefore, we
essentially estimate the employment effect with the observations shown in column (5). We
further drop the observations with missing values on the additional control variables in the
wage equation, we are left with the observations shown in column (6), which are then used
in the wage equation.
Table A 4: The processing of merged data

























2003 26,721 24,719 24,719 7,362 17,357 17,213
2004 42,605 39,184 35,068 5,583 29,485 28,897
2005 43,966 41,820 36,213 4,600 31,613 28,864
2006 51,073 48,213 29,524 10,864 18,660 18,388
Total 164,365 153,936 125,524 28,409 97,115 93,362
The description of the regression sample, i.e. the sample shown in the columns (5) and



































































Table A 5: The description of regression data
Variable Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max
ln employment 97,115 5.34 1.09 2.08 10.59
ln wage 97,115 2.64 0.56 -3.14 6.92
FVAT R (%) 97,115 12.46 2.67 0 17.00
Control variables in employment equation
ln value-added per capita 97,115 3.90 1.06 -4.16 9.30
ln firm GDP per capita 97,115 9.93 0.82 -1.35 11.28
ln firm population 97,115 4.19 1.17 -9.33 7.01
ln firm distance 97,115 8.42 0.73 3.83 9.86
Capital-labor ratio 97,115 3.52 1.37 -4.35 10.22
Share of value-added in output 97,115 0.25 0.14 0 1.00
Share of domestic sales in total sales 97,115 0.43 0.41 0 1.00
Share of non-eligible exports in total exports 97,115 0.07 0.23 0 1.00
ln firm age 97,115 2.00 0.68 0 4.62
(Additional) control variables in wage equation
Unemployment rate (%) 93,362 3.59 0.81 1.30 6.50
Labor market tightness 93,362 1.22 0.90 0.34 6.66
Labor market matching efficiency 93,362 0.50 0.08 0.11 0.90



































































A.3 Full tables on the employment and wage effects
Table A 6: The full table on the employment effect of VAT rebates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FVAT R 0.128 0.041 0.283 0.236
(0.087) (0.076) (0.088)*** (0.077)***
ln wage -0.068 -0.101
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
ln value-added per capita -0.137 -0.163
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
ln firm GDP per capita 0.010 0.002
(0.003)*** (0.003)
ln firm population 0.014 0.011
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
ln firm distance 0.028 0.012
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
Capital-labor ratio -0.226 -0.225
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
Share of value-added 0.459 0.532
(0.019)*** (0.020)***
Share of domestic sales -0.028 -0.036
(0.007)*** (0.006)***
Share of non-eligible exports -0.076 -0.062
(0.020)*** (0.020)***
ln firm age 0.275 0.145
(0.007)*** (0.007)***
cons 5.329 5.804 5.310 6.434
(0.011)*** (0.050)*** (0.011)*** (0.052)***
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Ad j.R2 0.918 0.940 0.920 0.942
# observations 97,115 97,115 97,115 97,115
Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point estimates.



































































Table A 7: The full table on the wage effect of VAT rebates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FVAT R -0.676 -0.381 -0.060 -0.027
(0.101)*** (0.093)*** (0.092) (0.091)
ln employment -0.114 -0.150
(0.008)*** (0.008)***
ln value-added per capita 0.203 0.161
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
ln firm GDP per capita 0.004 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
ln firm population 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
ln firm distance 0.015 -0.000
(0.006)*** (0.005)
Capital-labor ratio 0.047 0.039
(0.004)*** (0.004)***
Share of value-added -0.527 -0.410
(0.021)*** (0.021)***
Share of domestic sales -0.008 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008)
Share of non-eligible exports 0.043 0.060
(0.022)** (0.021)***
ln firm age 0.175 0.050
(0.007)*** (0.007)***
Unemployment rate -0.151 0.067
(0.007)*** (0.008)***
Labor market tightness -0.005 -0.002
(0.002)*** (0.002)
Labor market matching efficiency 0.003 -0.050
(0.029) (0.029)*
cons 2.705 2.470 2.629 2.451
(0.013)*** (0.081)*** (0.011)*** (0.079)***
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Ad j.R2 0.557 0.637 0.615 0.654
# observations 93,362 93,362 93,362 93,362
Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***,




































































In this section, we provide additional analysis on the effects of VAT rebates. To explore the
impact of VAT rebates on other firm-level variables, we estimate a specification similar to
equation (11), in which we replace dependent variable with other firm-level variables.
Exports
The first additional analysis is about the exports. The results on export value and export
quantity are shown in columns (1) and (2) of table A8. As shown in the columns, higher
VAT rebates significantly increase firms’ export value and export quantity. Moreover, we
calculate firm-level export price as firm’s export value divided by export quantity. As shown
in the column (3), export price also increases with higher VAT rebates. To the extent that
export price serves as a proxy for export quality, the result suggests that firms may upgrade
export quality in response to higher VAT rebates.
Financial Constraints
The increases in VAT rebates essentially represent cash flows back to firms, potentially relax-
ing firms’ financial constraints. To investigate the effect of VAT rebates on firms’ financial
constraints, we follow Manova and Yu (2016) to construct two measures of firms’ financial
constraints:
liquidityit =







Liquidity measures firms’ liquid capital, while leverage shows to what extent firms are con-
strained to manage cash flows or to raise external capital. As a result, the higher the liquidity
is and the lower the leverage is, the less financially constrained the firms are. The results on
the financial constraints are shown in columns (4) and (5) of table A8. As shown in column
(4), an increase in the firm-specific rate of VAT rebates raises firms’ liquidity. This sug-
gests that higher VAT rebates make firms less financially constrained. As shown in column
(5), firms’ leverage decreases when firm-specific rate of VAT rebates is higher. This again




































































Finally, we investigate the effects of VAT rebates on firms’ investment and use of materials.
This analysis sheds lights on whether firms adjust investment and the use of materials when
receiving more VAT rebates. The investment of firm i in year t is measured as Investmentit =
kit+1− kit +Depreciationit , where kit(+1) is the value of capital of firm i in year t(+1) and
Depreciationit is value of depreciation of firm i in year t. The results are presented in
columns (6) and (7) of table A8. The effects of VAT rebates on investment and the use of
materials are not significant, suggesting that firms do not adjust investment and the use of
materials when facing different VAT rebates.
Table A 8: Additional analysis of the effects of VAT rebates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Export Export Export
value quantity price Liquidity Leverage Investment Materials
FVAT R 2.458 1.599 0.860 0.187 -0.895 0.031 0.247
(0.561)*** (0.606)*** (0.317)*** (0.106)* (0.543)* (0.527) (0.160)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ad j.R2 0.787 0.853 0.904 0.602 0.328 0.622 0.878
# observations 94,502 94,502 94,502 96,285 96,285 49,423 97,115
In columns (1)-(5), the control variables include firm productivity, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level
variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic sales,
the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. In columns (6) and (7), the control variables include
firm productivity, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, firm-level demand shocks,
firm-level variable trade cost, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age.
Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and *



































































A.5 Other robustness checks
In the main analysis, we control for firm productivity (labor productivity) using value added
per capita in the estimations of the employment and wage effects. In table A9, we report the
results using total factor productivity (TFP). More specifically, TFP estimated from Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003) approach in which materials are used to control for the unobserved
productivity is used in column (1) while TFP estimated from Olley and Pakes (1996) ap-
proach in which investment is used to control for the unobserved productivity is used in
column (2). In columns (3) and (4), TFP is estimated from Ackerberg et al. (2015) approach
with investment and materials are used to control for unobserved productivity, respectively.
All results are consistent with the baseline results.
Table A 9: The employment and wage effects: alternative controls of firm productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: ln employment
FVAT R 0.183 0.204 0.192 0.199
(0.076)** (0.077)*** (0.077)** (0.077)***
Ad j.R2 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939
# observations 97,515 97,515 97,515 97,515
Panel B: ln wage
FVAT R 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.026
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Ad j.R2 0.641 0.640 0.640 0.640
# observations 93,755 93,755 93,755 93,755
Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Other control variables in the employment equation include firm wage, firm-level demand shocks, firm-
level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic
sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. Other control variables in the wage equation include
firm employment, unemployment rate, labor market tightness, labor market matching efficiency, firm-level
demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output,
the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. Standard errors are clustered




































































In table A10, we provides more results on the robustness checks. In column (1), we
follow Olley and Pakes (1996) and address the potential bias from firm exit by modeling the
probability to survive in the foreign market as a function of observed variables. We define
an indicator Survival to be one if the firm continues to export and zero if the firm exits. We
use firm-level production data of year 2007 in CASMF to identify whether the firms in year
2006 continue to export in year 2007. We estimate the probability to survive Pr(Survivalit =
1)=Φ(FVAT Rit−1,Xit−1,ςt ,εit) and use the predicted probability to survive as an additional
control variable to estimate the employment and wage effects. In column (2), we regress the
lagged firm-specific rate of VAT rebates by one year on the contemporaneous employment
and wage. In column (3) we exclude outliers whose employment (wage) is at the top 5% or
bottom 5% of all firms in each sector. In column (4) and (5), we replace year fixed effects
with stricter sector-year fixed effects. All results are consistent.
Table A 10: Other robustness checks on the employment and wage effects of VAT rebates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm exit Time lag Outliers Sector-year fixed effects
Panel A: ln employment
FVAT R 0.658 0.153 0.181 0.235 0.150
(0.087)*** (0.081)* (0.077)** (0.089)*** (0.078)*
Ad j.R2 0.942 0.953 0.922 0.925 0.943
# observations 97,115 84,099 87,087 97,113 97,113
Panel B: ln wage
FVAT R 0.113 0.104 -0.007 0.005 0.015
(0.102) (0.095) (0.066) (0.094) (0.095)
Ad j.R2 0.654 0.685 0.694 0.637 0.655
# observations 93,362 80,799 81,808 93,361 93,361
Controls YES YES YES NO YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES Sector-year fixed effects
The control variables in the employment equation include firm wage, value added per capita, firm-level
demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output,
the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. The control variables in the
wage equation include firm employment, value added per capita, unemployment rate, labor market tight-
ness, labor market matching efficiency, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital
intensity, the share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible
exports and firm age. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point



































































A.6 Robustness on the heterogeneity in firm productivity
In the main analysis of heterogeneous employment and wage effects, we use TFP estimated
from Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach to classify whether a firm is a low-productivity
firm or a high-productivity firm. In table A11, we report the results using TFP estimated
from Olley and Pakes (1996) approach to classify firms in columns (1) and (2), using TFP
estimated from Ackerberg et al. (2015) approach with investment to control for unobserved
productivity in columns (3) and (4), and using TFP estimated from Ackerberg et al. (2015)
approach with materials to control for unobserved productivity in columns (5) and (6). The
results are robust.
Table A 11: Heterogeneity in alternative firm productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low High Low High Low High
Panel A: ln employment
FVAT R 0.268 0.154 0.276 0.191 0.372 0.105
(0.106)** (0.109) (0.118)** (0.100)* (0.114)*** (0.103)
Ad j.R2 0.945 0.940 0.941 0.944 0.943 0.942
# observations 53,699 43,416 52,212 44,903 53,265 43,850
Panel B: ln wage
FVAT R -0.183 0.125 -0.089 0.013 -0.133 0.063
(0.117) (0.139) (0.129) (0.127) (0.117) (0.136)
Ad j.R2 0.649 0.648 0.638 0.665 0.614 0.670
# observations 51,970 41,392 50,526 42,836 51,676 41,686
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
The control variables in the employment equation include firm wage, value added per capita, firm-level
demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output,
the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. The control variables in the
wage equation include firm employment, value added per capita, unemployment rate, labor market tight-
ness, labor market matching efficiency, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital
intensity, the share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible
exports and firm age. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point



































































In tables A12 and A13, we additionally control for the interaction terms between firm-
specific rate of VAT rebates and other variables that are potentially correlated with firm
productivity, i.e. capital intensity and skill intensity. More specifically, we use firms’ capital-
labor ratio in their initial year and in 2003 as well as the contemporaneous capital-labor ratio.
We measure skill intensity using the percentage of skilled workers, defined as the workers
with college degree, bachelor degree, master degree or above, in the employment. The data
on the skill composition of employment is only available in 2004. Therefore, we use the
skill intensity in 2004. The results on the heterogeneous employment and wage effects in
firm productivity are robust.
Table A 12: Heterogeneous employment effect in firm productivity: additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FVAT R 0.725 1.013 0.886 0.994 1.099 1.248
(0.299)** (0.324)***(0.386)** (0.422)** (0.347)***(0.377)***
TFP initial ×FVAT R -0.135 -0.142
(0.067)** (0.073)*
TFP 2003 ×FVAT R -0.188 -0.187
(0.082)** (0.085)**




Capital-labor initial ×FVAT R 0.005 -0.031
(0.053) (0.066)
Capital-labor 2003 ×FVAT R -0.003 -0.012
(0.074) (0.095)
Capital-labor ×FVAT R -0.032 -0.069
(0.060) (0.073)
Skill-intensity 2004 ×FVAT R -1.318 -0.910 -1.079
(0.592)** (0.797) (0.582)*
Ad j.R2 0.942 0.943 0.942 0.943 0.944 0.944
# observations 97,115 85,895 54,349 50,893 97,115 85,895
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
The control variables in the employment equation include firm wage, value added per capita, firm-level
demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output,
the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. The control variables in the
wage equation include firm employment, value added per capita, unemployment rate, labor market tight-
ness, labor market matching efficiency, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital
intensity, the share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible
exports and firm age. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point



































































Table A 13: Heterogeneous wage effect in firm productivity: additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FVAT R 0.828 0.767 0.373 0.401 0.569 0.445
(0.496)* (0.543) (0.723) (0.772) (0.435) (0.465)
TFP initial ×FVAT R -0.149 -0.151
(0.124) (0.138)
TFP 2003 ×FVAT R -0.054 -0.062
(0.178) (0.192)




Capital-labor initial ×FVAT R -0.096 -0.039
(0.063) (0.069)
Capital-labor 2003 ×FVAT R -0.080 -0.017
(0.086) (0.087)
Capital-labor ×FVAT R -0.113 -0.049
(0.061)* (0.064)
Skill-intensity 2004 ×FVAT R -1.826 -1.656 -1.847
(0.990)* (1.188) (0.972)*
Ad j.R2 0.654 0.657 0.658 0.662 0.654 0.657
# observations 93362 82850 52699 49441 93362 82850
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
The control variables in the employment equation include firm wage, value added per capita, firm-level
demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital intensity, the share of value-added in total output,
the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible exports and firm age. The control variables in the
wage equation include firm employment, value added per capita, unemployment rate, labor market tight-
ness, labor market matching efficiency, firm-level demand shocks, firm-level variable trade cost, capital
intensity, the share of value-added in total output, the share of domestic sales, the share of non-eligible
exports and firm age. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and stated in parentheses below point
estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively.
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